Evidentialism, Explanationism, and Beliefs About the Future

Academic Article

Abstract

  • Earl Conee and Richard Feldman have argued that epistemic support should be understood in terms of explanatory considerations. Very roughly, they hold that one's evidence supports a given proposition when that proposition is part of the best explanation of one's evidence. This proposal is attractive, but T. Ryan Byerly has recently argued that it is false. Byerly claims that such explanationist accounts of epistemic support cannot account for the fact that one's evidence can support propositions about the future. Although Byerly presents an interesting challenge, his argument is problematic and, ultimately, unconvincing. © 2013 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht.
  • Authors

    Digital Object Identifier (doi)

    Author List

  • McCain K
  • Start Page

  • 99
  • End Page

  • 109
  • Volume

  • 79
  • Issue

  • 1