Explanationist evidentialism

Academic Article

Abstract

  • In their most recent co-authored work, Conee and Feldman (2008) suggest that epistemic support should be understood in terms of best explanations. Although this suggestion is plausible, Conee and Feldman admit that they have not provided the necessary details for a complete account of epistemic support. This article offers an explanationist account of epistemic support of the kind that Conee and Feldman suggest. It is argued that this account of epistemic support yields the intuitively correct results in a wide variety of cases. Further, this explanationist account of epistemic support is not susceptible to objections that Lehrer (1974) and Goldman (2011) have raised for similar accounts of epistemic support. © 2013, Cambridge University Press. All rights reserved.
  • Authors

    Published In

  • Episteme  Journal
  • Digital Object Identifier (doi)

    Author List

  • McCain K
  • Start Page

  • 299
  • End Page

  • 315
  • Volume

  • 10
  • Issue

  • 3